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THE TERMINATOR AS ERASER: HOW ARNOLD
SCHWARZENEGGER USED THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY TO TERMINATE NON-DEFAMATORY
POLITICAL SPEECH*
David S. Welkowitz** and Tyler T. Ochoa***
I. INTRODUCTION
While it is no longer unusual for a politician to have been
a recent celebrity in the commercial world of entertainment,'
the Schwarzenegger bobblehead case is one of the rare cases
in which a politician has filed a lawsuit asserting a right of
publicity claim.' However, the Schwarzenegger case and its
* Copyright © 2005 by David S. Welkowitz and Tyler T. Ochoa. At the authors'
request, parallel citations to the state reporters, when available, have been in-
cluded.
** Professor, Center for Intellectual Property Law, Whittier Law School. A.B.
1975, Princeton University; J.D. 1978, New York University.
*** Professor and Academic Director, High Technology Law Institute, Santa
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1. California seems to have been on the cutting edge here, with Ronald
Reagan (Governor, President), George Murphy (Senator), Sonny Bono (U.S.
Representative), and Clint Eastwood (Mayor), among others. An example of the
opposite move-from politician to actor (actually, from lawyer to actor to politi-
cian and back to actor)-is former Tennessee Senator Fred Dalton Thompson,
currently playing the role of District Attorney Arthur Branch on NBC's televi-
sion series Law and Order.
2. The most prominent, albeit indirect, example was when the New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, asserting then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani's
right of publicity, denied New York Magazine the right to advertise on city
buses using the slogan "Possibly the only good thing in New York Rudy hasn't
taken credit for." New York Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123,
125 (2d Cir. 1998). Recognizing that "protecting the right to express skeptical
attitudes toward the government ranks among the First Amendment's most im-
portant functions," id. at 131, the Second Circuit ruled that the MTA's action
was an impermissible prior restraint, id. at 131-32.
Conversely, there have been some recent cases in which political candi-
dates have been sued by companies who claimed that the candidates' adver-
tisements infringed their trademarks. See, e.g., MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader
2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) available at
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settlement exposed some basic flaws in the analysis of celeb-
rity rights problems, flaws that are not unique to its
political context. Two of those flaws converged in this case
and are the main subjects of this article. First, rights of pub-
licity claims frequently are used as a "stealth" alternative to
defamation claims, in order to circumvent the constitutional
limitations on defamation claims. Second, the analysis
promulgated by the California Supreme Court in Comedy III
Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.3 and its progeny,'
though recognizing some of the First Amendment problems
posed by these cases, has serious faults that undermine its
assertedly protective sphere. Both of these problems lead to
the suppression of free speech and were at the root of the set-
tlement in the Schwarzenegger bobblehead case.
II. USING RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY IN LIEU OF DEFAMATION
Ever since the landmark case of New York TYmes Co. v.
Sullivan,5 it has been understood that the First Amendment
creates a substantial hurdle for politicians and other public
figures seeking to sue those who criticize and disparage
them.' A public figure suing for defamation must show that
the criticism was false and defamatory and that it was made
with "actual malice"-that is, there must be clear and con-
vincing evidence that the false statements were made with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their
truth or falsity.7 Since New York Times, public figures have
sought ways to avoid these strict requirements for a success-
2004 WL 434404 (parody of MasterCard's "Priceless" campaign); American
Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (parody of
the AFLAC duck). In both cases, the candidates prevailed.
3. 25 Cal. 4th 387, 21 P.3d 797, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (2001).
4. See Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 69 P.3d 473, 134 Cal. Rptr.
2d 634 (2003), discussed infra at notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. Technically, New York Tmes only involved a public official. The Court
extended the holding to other public figures in Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring), id. at 170 (opinion of Black, J.,
joined by Douglas, J., concurring in Parts I and II of Warren's opinion); id. at
172 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, J., concurring in Parts I and II of
Warren's opinion).
7. New York Y'mes, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (holding that actual malice is re-
quired); id. at 285-86 (stating that the evidence "lacks the convincing clarity
which the constitutional standard demands").
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ful defamation suit. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,' for
example, the Rev. Jerry Falwell sued Hustler for both defa-
mation and intentional infliction of emotional distress for
publishing a parody advertisement lampooning him.9 The
jury held for Hustler on the defamation claim,' ° but it
awarded Falwell $200,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages on the emotional distress claim." The Supreme
Court prevented this "end run" by holding that the adver-
tisement must be judged by the standard set forth in New
York imes, thus, changing the nomenclature from defama-
tion to intentional infliction of emotional distress did not
change the constitutional test. 12 As the Schwarzenegger bob-
blehead case and other recent cases have shown, however,
public figures often turn to rights of publicity to avoid the
New York Times standard. Although such suits are not al-
ways successful, courts are often more sympathetic to right of
publicity claims than to defamation claims.
The complaint in the Schwarzenegger bobblehead case
did not contain any allegations of defamation," and, on its
face, it did not look like a defamation claim. The complaint al-
leged that the defendants' unauthorized manufacture and
sale of a bobblehead doll featuring Governor Schwarzeneg-
ger's likeness was a violation of his right of publicity," action-
able under California's statutory and common-law causes of
action for misappropriation of a person's identity for commer-
8. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
9. Id. The advertisement was a take-off on advertisements for Campari
liqueur, which featured celebrities reminiscing about their "first time"-a dou-
ble entendre meant to suggest sex, but which actually referred to their first
time drinking the liqueur. Id. at 48. In Falwel, the parody advertisement de-
picted Falwell's "first time" as "a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his
mother in an outhouse." Id.
10. The jury specifically found that the advertisement could not "reasonably
be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in
which [he] participated." Id. at 49.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 56 (applying New York Times test); David S. Welkowitz,
Trademark Parody after Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 11 CoMM. & THE L. 65
(Dec. 1989).
13. See Complaint, Oak Prods., Inc. v. Ohio Disc. Merch., Inc., No.
SC081563 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 2004).
14. See id. $ 17-21. The complaint also asserted a claim for unfair compe-
tition. Id. $$ 22-25. See The Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Case: Introduction
and Statement of Facts, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 552-53 & n.46 (2005).
6532005
SANTA CLARA LA W RVIE W
cial purposes.' 5 But the settlement of the case revealed the
true nature of the claim. The doll in question featured
Schwarzenegger clothed in a business suit (befitting a public
official), carrying an assault rifle with a bandolier around his
shoulder. 6 The settlement permitted the defendants to make
and sell a bobblehead doll of Schwarzenegger, but without the
assault rifle and bandolier.'7 Belying the complaint's allega-
tion that Schwarzenegger does not allow merchandising of his
likeness except in connection with his movies,' 8 the settle-
ment demonstrates that what Schwarzenegger objected to
was not really the use of his image; it was the use of his im-
age in a particular way that was the problem. Governor
Schwarzenegger was offended (or at least politically con-
cerned) about being portrayed as a real-life lover of military-
style weapons (in the manner of several of his action-movie
characters, such as the Terminator). Whether this was de-
famatory is beside the point; the focal point of the lawsuit was
an unflattering portrait of a public official. This is precisely
the type of criticism that the New York Times rule was de-
signed to protect. Had a newspaper published a caricature of
Schwarzenegger in a business suit with an assault rifle, it is
clear that the caricature would have been protected by the
First Amendment under the New York Times standard. 9 But
because the same caricature was sold in three-dimensional
form, Schwarzenegger was able to use the right of publicity to
censor criticism of his political persona."
15. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416-17, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 346-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing common-law cause of action
for appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness, in addition to statutory rem-
edy); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2005) ("Any person who knowingly uses
another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or
in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such
person's prior consent,.., shall be liable for any damages sustained by the per-
son or persons injured as a result thereof.").
16. See Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 14, at 551 & Ap-
pendix A. The plaintiffs complaint did not describe or depict the doll; only the
defendant's "cross complaint" describes the doll's appearance. See Cross-
Complaint for Declaratory Relief 9 5, Oak Prods., Inc. v. Ohio Discount Mer-
chandise, Inc., No. SC081563 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. filed May 27, 2004).
17. See Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 14, at 554.
18. Id. at 549 & n.16.
19. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 53-55 (discussing the important role played by
caricature and political cartoons in public and political debate).
20. Ironically, it was only the presence of the assault rifle and bandolier
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Some of these "stealth defamation" right of publicity
claims are not so stealthy. In Eastwood v. Superior Court,2 '
for example, Clint Eastwood sued the National Enquirer for
both false-light invasion of privacy and violation of the right
of publicity over an allegedly false story about his love life.22
While the false-light claim included allegations of knowledge
or reckless disregard of falsity sufficient to satisfy the New
York Times standard, the right of publicity claim did not. 3
The court blocked this transparent attempt to recover dam-
ages for reputational harm without having to prove "actual
malice" by holding that a "deliberate fictionalization" violates
the right of publicity only "when it is presented to the reader
as if true with the requisite scienter."" The requisite scienter
is the same as actual malice: "that the article was published
with knowledge or in reckless disregard of its falsity."2
Another fairly transparent attempt to use the right of
publicity as a substitute for a defamation claim is Winter v.
DC Comics,2' in which rock musicians Johnny and Edgar
Winter claimed that defendant's "Jonah Hex" comic book
misappropriated their likenesses when it depicted them as
grotesque half-worm, half-human creatures. The complaint
alleged that the comic book "falsely portrayed [the Winters]
as 'vile, depraved, stupid, cowardly, sub-human individuals
who engage in wanton acts of violence, murder and bestiality
for pleasure and who should be killed,"'2 7 and it included
claims for defamation and invasion of privacy. 2' The Califor-
that gave the defendants a fighting chance of winning the case, because those
were the elements that arguably made the doll "transformative" under the Sad-
erup standard. See infra notes 77-93 and accompanying text. Without the as-
sault rifle and bandolier, the doll almost certainly would have been enjoined
under the Saderup standard, because it would have been only a "literal depic-
tion or imitation of a celebrity." See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
21. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342.
22. Id. at 413-14, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
23. Id. at 415, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 345. The U.S. Supreme Court had previ-
ously held that claims for false-light invasion of privacy must also meet the New
York Times "actual malice" standard. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967).
24. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 426, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
25. Id. Because Eastwood did not allege the requisite scienter in the right
of publicity claim, it was dismissed with leave to replead. Id.
26. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 69
P.3d 473, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634 (2003).
27. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435.
28. Id.
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nia Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the defamation
and privacy claims on the ground that "no reasonable reader
would believe any portion of the depiction arguably relating
to appellants as factual,"29 but it reversed the dismissal of the
right of publicity claim." The California Supreme Court re-
versed, recognizing that "the right of publicity cannot, consis-
tent with the First Amendment, be a right to control the ce-
lebrity's image by censoring disagreeable portrayals."3
But even when it is fairly obvious that the right of public-
ity is being used as an alternative to defamation, many courts
have permitted such claims to go forward. The facts of Doe v.
TCI Cablevision,32 for example, are almost identical to those
in Winter. In Doe, Tony Twist, a former professional hockey
player known for being an "enforcer," sued Todd McFarlane,
creator of the comic book series Spawn, for including in his
comic book a fictional Mafia don named Antonio "Tony Twist"
Twistelli. 33 McFarlane stated publicly that many of his char-
acters, including Tony Twist, were named after professional
hockey players. 4 As in Winter, the complaint included a
defamation claim.35 In an effort to ward off the defamation
claim, the defendant argued that no reasonable person would
view the comic book as an assertion (factual or otherwise)
about the real Tony Twist.36  That argument came back to
haunt McFarlane when the Missouri Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's grant of McFarlane's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and ordered a new trial:
[Tihere is... an expressive component in the use of
[Twist's] name and identity as a metaphorical reference to
tough-guy "enforcers." And yet, respondents agree (per-
29. Id. at 438.
30. Id. at 442-43.
31. 30 Cal. 4th at 889, 69 P.3d at 478, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640 (quoting
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 403, 21 P.3d
797, 807, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 139 (2001)).
32. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
33. Id. at 366. The Missouri Supreme Court incorrectly stated that the first
name of the character was "Anthony" (Tony Twist's actual first name) rather
than "Antonio."
34. Id. at 366-67.
35. Id. at 365.
36. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 2002 WL 1610972 (Mo. App. 2002), at *3,
rev'd on othergrounds, 110 S.W.3d 363, 367 (Mo. 2003) ("McFarlane denied that
the comic book character was 'about' the real-life Tony Twist despite the fact
that the names were the same.").
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haps to avoid a defamation claim) that the use was not a
parody or other expressive comment or a fictionalized ac-
count of the real Twist. As such, the metaphorical refer-
ence to Twist, though a literary device, has very little lit-
erary value compared to its commercial value ....
[U]nder these circumstances, free speech must give way to
the right of publicity.
3 7
On retrial the jury awarded Twist $15 million," an
amount far in excess of any lost commercial value in the Tony
Twist name. 3' That the real purpose of Twist's suit was to re-
cover for his loss of dignity and reputational harm is demon-
strated by his attorney's statement after the retrial: "They
made Tony into a Mafia boss. He was involved in murders
and kidnappings and rapes."" McFarlane might have been
better off risking the defamation claim, with its well-
developed constitutional protections, than being stuck with a
right of publicity claim, where the defenses are far more lim-
ited.1
37. 110 S.W.3d at 374. This reasoning places the defendant in a combined
defamation and right of publicity suit in a no-win situation: if the use is viewed
as an assertion of fact, the defamation claim may survive summary judgment;
but if the use is not viewed as an assertion at all, the defendant loses his First
Amendment defense to the right of publicity claim.
38. See Peter Shinkle, Tony Twist Wins $15 Million Verdict, ST. LOUIs
POST-DISPATCH, July 10, 2004, at 13, available at 2004 WL 84634558. The
original jury verdict had been for $24.5 million. 110 S.W.3d at 365.
39. Indeed, the trial judge had ruled that when McFarlane first used the
name, Tony Twist "had no market recognition and 'was earning precisely zero
income from endorsements.'" Kevin Strickland, You Can Call Me Lex, PICKENS
COUNTY HERALD, July 21, 2004, available at
http://theherald.pickens.net/sports/side072104.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
In the words of one commentator:
McFarlane creates a fictional comic book character who shares a name
with a nobody from St. Louis.... A few years later, Mr. Nobody be-
comes a low-watt star, barely known in his own town and completely
invisible to most of the nation. The character created by McFarlane is
part of an empire that reaches worldwide. For every one person who
has heard of Tony Twist the hockey player, there are a thousand who
know Tony Twist the Spawn villain. And the courts give millions to the
hockey guy? McFarlane should sue the hockey player for degrading the
worth of his character by being such a complete whiner.
Id.
40. See Shinkle, supra note 38.
41. If the defamation claim had gone forward, Twist would have had to
prove that McFarlane's readers understood the comic book to be a statement of
fact, that the statements were false, and that they were made with knowledge
or in reckless disregard of falsity. By misusing the right of publicity, Twist was
able to obtain the same result without having to prove any of those elements.
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Similarly, in Newcombe v. Adolph Coors Co.,4  Don New-
combe, a former major league pitcher and recovering alco-
holic, sued when a drawing based on a photograph of him
pitching in the 1949 World Series was used in a beer adver-
tisement.43  The complaint included claims for defamation,
false-light privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress." The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
the defendants on the merits of those claims,45 but it permit-
ted the right of publicity claim to go forward, 6 despite the
lack of any evidence that the defendants were intentionally
attempting to capitalize on Newcombe's fame.47
Other cases are truly "stealth" defamation claims, in
which the reputational interest of the celebrity is less obvi-
ous. Vanna White sued when an advertisement for Samsung
Electronics poked fun at her by implying that she could be re-
placed by a robot.' Major League Baseball players sued over
parody baseball cards that made fun of their egos and other
characteristics. 9 Muhammad Ali sued when a drawing of
him sitting naked in a boxing ring was published in Playgirl
magazine." Johnny Carson sued the maker of a portable toi-
let called "Here's Johnny."5 None of these cases involved de-
famatory criticism of the celebrity; but in each case, the de-
fendant used the cultural associations denoted by the
42. 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998).
43. Id. at 689-90.
44. Id.
45. Id at 694-96.
46. Id. at 692-94.
47. Id. at 696 ("we cannot say that Cassidy copied the photograph with an
intent to harm Newcombe. Furthermore, there is no evidence that anyone else
associated with the production of the advertisement intended that it portray
Newcombe, nor that they were aware that the drawing closely resembled New-
combe.").
48. See White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (opinion of Kozinski, J., joined
by O'Scannlain & Kleinfeld, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
For commentary, see David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a
Wall The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 67 (1995).
49. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 95 F.3d
959 (10th Cir. 1996).
50. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
51. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th
Cir. 1983). Carson's claim strongly resembled a trademark dilution claim, be-
cause Carson used the phrase "Here's Johnny" as an unregistered trademark for
restaurants and men's clothing.
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celebrity to make a point-a sort of commercial commentary.
In each case, what was really at stake was a dignity interest,
rather than a strictly commercial interest;52 and in all but one
of these cases, the celebrity was successful.53
Why are courts as protective as they are of celebrity
rights, even when it is fairly obvious that the impetus for the
complaint is to control a perceived disparagement, rather
than to stop a purely "commercial" exploitative use of the ce-
lebrity likeness? In Doe, for example, although the defen-
dants disclaimed any intent to comment on the hockey
player,54 it is obvious that the defendants' intent was to draw
a parallel between the "enforcers" in hockey and those in the
Mafia. If the portrayal was defamatory, then New York
rmes should be in the forefront of the analysis, because the
plaintiff was a public figure. If it was not defamatory, but
merely disparaging, then shouldn't the First Amendment
values guiding New York Times protect the right of the de-
fendant to criticize the plaintiff-even unfairly?
The problem in Doe and similar cases is that courts have
separated the "property" right that the celebrity claims in his
or her image from the actual human being whose image is
used. Courts too often view these cases as a misappropriation
of a plaintiffs property right solely for commercial purposes,
as if the "property" was a copyrighted work that was being
duplicated for profit, rather than as a commentary about a
person whose celebrity status is legitimately the subject of
public scrutiny. In White, for example, the court dismissed
the First Amendment argument almost out of hand, because
Vanna White's "persona" had been used to help sell a prod-
uct.55 The reality is more complicated. The advertisement in
52. For example, in a subsequent appeal involving Cardtoons' claims for tor-
tious interference with contractual relations and libel, the Tenth Circuit stated
that "Cardtoons may well be correct in asserting that part of MLBPA's motiva-
tion in threatening legal action was to prevent the production of cards that they
believed to be unflattering." Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players'
Ass'n, 335 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2003).
53. The exception is Cardtoons, in which the Tenth Circuit affirmed a judg-
ment for the creator of the parody baseball cards. Cardtoons was unsuccessful,
however, in recovering damages from the players for tortious interference with
Cardtoons' business. See Cardtoons, 335 F.3d at 1164-68.
54. As the Missouri Supreme Court noted, this may have been an attempt to
avoid a defamation claim. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
55. See White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("The ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient
6592005
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question did not use a picture of Vanna White-it used a ro-
bot dressed in a wig and evening gown." It was making fun
of her, saying in effect that a robot could do her job. Isn't it
likely that at least part of her motivation in bringing suit was
to avenge this perceived slight? Similarly, in the Schwar-
zenegger case, isn't it obvious from the settlement that his
motivation in bringing suit was to remove an unflattering
caricature of him from the marketplace?57
Certainly the makers of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead
doll hoped to make a profit; but the idea behind the doll was
also to make a comment about the actor-turned-politician.
Likewise, Samsung hoped to make a profit selling VCRs, but
in doing so it took a part of our cultural landscape, poked fun
at it, and used it as part of an advertisement. We ought to
celebrate, or at least tolerate, such creativity; but instead we
allow courts to punish such conduct because it is a "commer-
cial" use. All too often, as soon as something is characterized
as a "commercial" use, the court forgets about other aspects of
the use and brushes off First Amendment concerns. In cases
like White, that is a serious error. To characterize that case
simply as a commercial misappropriation is too facile. What
courts need to recognize is that a celebrity image conjures up
the celebrity (and all of his or her attendant personality traits
and connotations) as a subject for legitimate comment; it is
not just some separable, tangible creation of the celebrity.
One may argue, as the Doe court held, that the Supreme
Court recognizes differences between the right of publicity
and defamation that make the former not subject to the same
constitutional restrictions as the latter. But that argument,
based on the Court's sole right of publicity case-Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.59-ignores the language
and context of Zacchini. As the majority repeatedly empha-
sized, Zacchini involved a claim that the broadcaster appro-
priated the plaintiffs "entire act" by broadcasting it on a news
and only tangentially related to the ad's primary message: 'buy Samsung VCRs.'
Defendants' parody arguments are better addressed to non-commercial paro-
dies. The difference between a 'parody' and a 'knock-off is the difference be-
tween fun and profit.").
56. Id. at 1396.
57. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
58. See Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 14, at 551 & n.34.
59. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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program." The majority explained its holding almost entirely
in terms of economic harm:
[T]he broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike
the unauthorized use of another's name for purposes of
trade ... goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a
living as an entertainer. Thus, in this case, Ohio has rec-
ognized what may be the strongest case for a "right of pub-
licity" involving, not the appropriation of an entertainer's
reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial
product, but the appropriation of the very activity by
which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first
place.61
It is true that the Court distinguished its defamation
cases (notably New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan,2 and Time,
Inc. v. Hilf); but the Court's distinction was based on an un-
derstanding of the role of rights of publicity that does not fit
the "commercial commentary" or "stealth defamation" cases.
The Court in Zacchini described the state interests in provid-
ing different forms of protection to plaintiffs as follows:
The interest protected in permitting recovery for placing
the plaintiff in a false light is clearly that of reputation,
with the same overtones of mental distress as in defama-
tion. By contrast, the State's interest in permitting a right
of publicity is in protecting the proprietary interest of the
individual in his act in part to encourage such entertain-
ment .... [This] interest is closely analogous to the goals
of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having
little to do with protecting feelings or reputation. Second,
the two torts differ in the degree to which they intrude on
dissemination of information to the public. In [defamation
and] false light cases the only way to protect the interests
involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the dam-
aging matter, while in right of publicity cases the only
60. Id. at 569 ("His complaint is that respondent filmed his entire act and
displayed that film on television for the public to see and enjoy. This, he
claimed, was an appropriation of his professional property."); see also id. at 575
("[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when
they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent."); id. at 575 ("The
broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a substantial threat to the
economic value of that performance.").
61. Id. at 576.
62. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
63. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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question is who gets to do the publishing.r
Even if that accurately described Mr. Zacchini's situa-
tion, it surely is not an accurate description of the cases
brought in Winter or Doe, nor the case brought by Governor
Schwarzenegger. In each of those cases, the principal pur-
pose of the suit was to enjoin and punish publication of
speech that offended the plaintiff, rather than to vindicate
primarily commercial interests. Even cases such as White,
Carson, and Newcombe, while based on a "commercial" use of
the individual's identity, cannot be said to have little to do
with protecting feelings or reputation. The additional ele-
ment of critical commentary and/or dignity, whether denomi-
nated "commercial" or "expressive," makes these cases distin-
guishable from Zacchini and demands a higher level of
scrutiny than the minimal levels often seen in these cases.
III. WHY EXISTING FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS ARE
FLAWED
In the past fifteen years, courts have propounded various
tests for "balancing" rights of publicity and the First Amend-
ment. Three principal tests have emerged, all of which pur-
port to allow sufficient breathing room for free expression
while protecting celebrity rights. But even these relatively
sophisticated analyses are flawed, because they allow celebri-
ties, politicians and other public figures to censor non-
defamatory speech without any corresponding public benefit.
A. The Rogers Standard
In Rogers v. Grimaldi,65 the Second Circuit considered a
claim by actress Ginger Rogers against the producers of a
movie entitled Ginger and Fred.66 The movie was not a docu-
mentary about the famous dancing partnership of Rogers and
Fred Astaire; it was a fictional film about a pair of Italian
cabaret dancers who had acquired the nicknames "Ginger and
Fred" because in their heyday they had imitated Rogers and
Astaire." The Second Circuit held that "[i]n the context of al-
64. 433 U.S. at 573 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
65. 875 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir. 1989).
66. GINGER AND FRED (MGM/UA 1986) (directed by Federico Fellini, star-
ring Giulietta Masina and Marcello Mastroianni).
67. 875 F.2d at 996-97.
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legedly misleading titles using a celebrity's name," neither
the Lanham Act nor Oregon's right of publicity law was vio-
lated "unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underly-
ing work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance,
unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the con-
tent of the work."68
The Rogers standard can be justified for titles of artistic
works on the ground that the public has an interest in avoid-
ing consumer confusion that must be balanced against the
public interest in free expression.69 It is well-settled that non-
defamatory books and movies about celebrities may be made
without the celebrity's permission," so the mere presence of a
celebrity's name in the title of a work does not by itself falsely
suggest endorsement of that work by the celebrity.71 How-
ever, the presence of a celebrity's name in the title of a work
probably does lead to a reasonable expectation that the work
has something to do with the celebrity, so enforcing that ex-
pectation serves the government's interest in avoiding con-
sumer deception."
68. Id. at 999 (Lanham Act); see also id. at 1004 (finding no violation of the
right of publicity "unless the title was wholly unrelated to the movie or was
'simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or ser-
vices.'").
69. Id. at 999 (Lanham Act), 1004 (right of publicity).
70. See, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 862, 603
P.3d 454, 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979) (Bird, C.J. concurring) (concerning
a fictionalized television biography of actor Rudolph Valentino); Hicks v. Casa-
blanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (concerning a fictionalized
book and movie about mystery writer Agatha Christie); Taylor v. National
Broadcasting Co., 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2433, 1994 WL 780690 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1994) (unpublished) (concerning a television biography of actress Elizabeth
Taylor); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, cmt. c (1995)
("[T]he right of publicity is not infringed by the dissemination of an unauthor-
ized print or broadcast biography. Use of another's identity in a novel, play or
motion picture is also not ordinarily an infringement."); see also Tyne v. Time
Warner Entm't Co., 901 So.2d 802 (Fla. 2005) (concerning a right of publicity
claim on behalf of heirs of persons depicted in motion picture THE PERFECT
STORM (Warner Bros. 2000); construing Florida statute narrowly to avoid First
Amendment difficulties).
71. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999-1000. The Court stated that "[iln these circum-
stances, the slight risk that such use of a celebrity's name might implicitly sug-
gest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed by the danger of
restricting artistic expression." Id. at 1000 (citing "the hit song 'Bette Davis
Eyes' and the recent film 'Come Back to the Five and Dime, Jimmy Dean,
Jimmy Dean.'").
72. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451-58, 461 (6th Cir.
2003) (concerning a suit by civil rights icon Rosa Parks against rap group that
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The problem arises when the Rogers standard is applied
not to the use of a celebrity's name in the title of an artistic
work, but to the use of the celebrity's likeness in the work it-
self. For example, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,3
the Sixth Circuit analyzed a claim that making and selling
lithographs of a painting of Tiger Woods violated his right of
publicity in part by asking whether "the presence of Woods'
image in Rush's painting... [had] artistic relevance to the
underlying work."74 In such a situation, the phrase "artistic
relevance" is devoid of meaning. Relevance is a relational
concept; it is used to describe the relationship between one
thing and another. 5 In the context of titles, "artistic rele-
vance" describes the relationship of the title to the underlying
work. But asking whether part of a work has artistic rele-
vance to the work itself is nonsensical: the work is what it is,
and removing any portion of it would create a different work.
Such a test is also an invitation to censorship, as it invites the
judge to choose a single "meaning" from among the myriad of
possible meanings of an artistic work and to excise those por-
tions of the work which in his or her own view are not suffi-
ciently related to that meaning.6
B. The Saderup Standard
In Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,77 the Califor-
used her name as the title of one of its songs; finding triable issue of fact as to
whether her name had any artistic relevance to the song); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, cmt. c (1995) ("However, if the name or
likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the
identified person, the user may be subject to liability for the use of the other's
identity in advertising.").
73. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). For background on the case, see Tyler T.
Ochoa, Introduction: Tiger Woods and the First Amendment, 22 WHITTIER L.
REV. 381 (2000); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Amicus Curiae Brief of Seventy-
Three Law Professors in Support of Jireh Publishing, Inc., 22 WHITTIER L. REV.
391 (2000).
74. 332 F.3d at 937.
75. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's notes ("Relevancy is
not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a rela-
tion between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.").
76. Modern artistic theory holds that a work of art does not have any objec-
tive meaning, but only whatever subjective meaning that it stimulates in the
mind of the beholder; and that the subjective intention of the artist is neither
possible to determine nor meaningful in assessing the artistic success of the
work. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch
Silenced a Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT. SOC'Y U.S. 546, 557 & nn.53-54 (1998).
77. 25 Cal. 4th 387, 21 P.3d 797, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (2001).
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nia Supreme Court was faced with a claim that reproductions
of a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges violated their post-
mortem right of publicity. The court first considered and re-
jected several proffered reasons why the First Amendment
should not be deemed to protect the defendant's work. First,
the court held that "although [Saderup's] work was done for
financial gain, the First Amendment is not limited to those
who publish without charge. An expressive activity does not
lose its constitutional protection because it is undertaken for
profit.""8 Second, "In]or do Saderup's creations lose their con-
stitutional protections because they are for purposes of enter-
taining rather than informing."" Third, "[n]or does the fact
that expression takes a form of nonverbal, visual representa-
tion remove it from the ambit of First Amendment protec-
tion."'  Fourth, "a work of art is protected by the First
Amendment even if it conveys no discernable message ....""
Fifth, "In]or does the fact that Saderup's art appears in large
part on a less conventional avenue of communications, T-
shirts, result in reduced First Amendment protection.
8 2
Sixth, the court held that "a reproduction.., is entitled to as
much First Amendment protection as an original work of
a r t .
, ,8
Nonetheless, the court held that Saderup's lithographs
and t-shirts were not protected by the First Amendment be-
cause of a countervailing government interest:
[S]ociety may recognize... that a celebrity's heirs and as-
signs have a legitimate protectible interest in exploiting
the value to be obtained from merchandising the celeb-
rity's image, whether that interest be conceived as a kind
of natural property right or as an incentive for encourag-
ing creative work. Although critics have questioned
whether the right of publicity truly serves any social pur-
pose, there is no question that the Legislature has a ra-
tional basis for permitting celebrities and their heirs to
78. Id. at 396, 21 P.3d at 802, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133 (internal brackets,
quotes, and ellipses omitted).
79. Id. at 398, 21 P.3d at 804, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134.
80. Id., 21 P.3d at 804, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134.
81. Id.; see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) ("[a] narrow, succinctly articulable mes-
sage is not a condition of constitutional protection").
82. 25 Cal. 4th at 399, 21 P.3d at 804, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 135.
83. Id. at 408, 21 P.3d at 810, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
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control the commercial exploitation of the celebrity's like-
84
ness.
The fact that the Legislature may have a rational basis
for protecting rights of publicity, however, does not explain
why the state's interest should overcome the expressive inter-
est in a work of art such as that at issue in Saderup. In par-
ticular, the court made no attempt to explain why the tradi-
tional content-based tests of the First Amendment should not
apply.85 In other contexts, of course, it is hornbook law that a
court must subject a content-based speech restriction to strict
scrutiny, 6 meaning the law must be the least restrictive
means necessary to accomplish a compelling government in-
terest.87 Even content-neutral speech restrictions must meet
intermediate scrutiny: the restriction must be narrowly tai-
lored to further a substantial government interest.88 Instead
of applying one of these speech-protective tests, the court ig-
nored the First Amendment interest almost entirely and gave
the right of publicity the deferential review applicable to or-
dinary economic regulation of conduct that does not have an
expressive component.
The standard the court adopted to "distinguish between
forms of artistic expression protected by the First Amend-
ment and those that must give way to the right of publicity"8
was a "transformative use" test,9 ° borrowed from case law ap-
84. Id. at 400, 21 P.3d at 805, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136 (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
85. When the right of publicity is used to preclude particular expression
(e.g., a particular likeness of a celebrity), it should be deemed a "content-based"
restriction. It is difficult to describe such a case as simply a content-neutral
"time, place, and manner" restriction, unless the word "manner" is defined
rather expansively. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Restrictions on the words or images
that may be used by a speaker.., are quite different than restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of speech.") (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
86. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
87. See Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002); Perry
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
88. Turner, 512 U.S. at 662.
89. Comedy III Prods., 25 Cal. 4th at 403, 21 P.3d at 807, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 139.
90. Id. at 404-07, 21 P.3d at 807-10, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139-42. The Court
repeated the word "transformative" thirteen times in those three pages (and
three more times in subsequently applying the test), both by itself and in such
phrases as "transformative work," "significant transformative elements," and
"transformative test."
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plying the fair use doctrine in copyright law91:
As the Supreme Court has stated, the central purpose of
the inquiry ... is to see.., whether the new work merely
supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
92
or message ....
Elaborating on this standard, the court opined:
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depic-
tion or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain... the
state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor
outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist."
The Saderup court's conclusion is flawed for at least two
reasons. First, in uncritically adopting a standard from copy-
right law, the court ignored the fact that copyright has a spe-
cific Constitutional authorization,94 adopted only four years
before the Bill of Rights, leading to the reasonable inference
that the Framers must have believed copyright was consis-
tent with the First Amendment.95 The right of publicity, by
contrast, has no such pedigree; rather, it was invented more
than 160 years after the First Amendment was adopted,9 6 is
91. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
92. Comedy III Prods., 25 Cal. 4th at 404, 21 P.3d at 808, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 139 (internal quotes and brackets omitted).
93. Id. at 405, 21 P.3d at 808, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140.
94. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."). For the historical background of the Clause, see Tyler T. Ochoa
& Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause,
49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S. 675 (2002).
95. See generally L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An
Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyrght Power Granted to Con-
gress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J.
909 (2003). As numerous authors have pointed out, however, in 1791 copyright
consisted only of a right to prohibit reproduction, and it is the broad right to
prepare derivative works, added later, that creates serious First Amendment
problems. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 48-59 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locat-
ing Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38
(2001); Lawrence Lessig, Coypight's First Amendment, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1057, 1061-62 (2001).
96. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866, 868 (2nd Cir. 1953). The right of publicity evolved from the right of pri-
vacy, which was first recognized approximately fifty years earlier. See Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). However, prior to
Haelan Labs, the right of privacy was generally not deemed to outweigh the
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not enshrined in the Constitution, and should not be deemed
to have reduced the First Amendment's scope of protection.97
Second, and more importantly, Saderudfs "transformative
use" standard contradicts two of the First Amendment princi-
ples that the court had endorsed earlier in its opinion. The
Saderup court stated that "a work of art is protected by the
First Amendment even if it conveys no discernable mes-
sage,"8 yet its standard expressly inquires whether the de-
fendant added "new expression, meaning, or message."99 The
court also correctly stated that "[a]n expressive activity does
not lose its constitutional protection because it is undertaken
for profit,"1 0 yet its standard expressly turns on whether the
"artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or
First Amendment in cases involving public figures. See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales
Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941). Note that there was a preexisting exception
for false endorsement cases in which the government's interest in preventing
consumer deception was also implicated. See, e.g., Edison v. Edison Polyform
Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907).
97. While we may tolerate some limits on freedom of speech in order to en-
joy the speech-generating incentive provided by copyright law, the right of pub-
licity does not provide a similar public benefit, except in advertising cases in-
volving false endorsement. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973-76 (criticizing and
limiting various rationales for the right of publicity); see also Michael Madow,
Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81
CAL. L. REV. 127, 178-215 (1993). This is evidenced by the fact that countries
such as the United Kingdom that lack a right of publicity have no shortage of
celebrities. See Irvine v. Talksport, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 414 (Ch. 2002) (holding that
an action for "passing off" is available in a false endorsement case, but not in a
character merchandising case), affd, 2 All E.R. 881 (C.A. 2003); cf Cairns v.
Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023-24 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding there
is no right of publicity in U.K.), affdmem. 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000), on ap-
peal after remand, 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of relief
against sale of merchandise featuring likeness of Diana, Princess of Wales).
Moreover, even if a state legislature were to decide otherwise, that judgment
should not be free from the heightened scrutiny applied in other First Amend-
ment contexts. See supra discussion at notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
98. Comedy IIIProds., 25 Cal. 4th at 399, 21 P.3d at 804, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 135.
99. Id. at 404, 21 P.3d at 808, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139. While "expression"
is not necessarily synonymous with "meaning or message," the court explained
that "when we use the word 'expression,' we mean expression of something
other than the likeness of the celebrity," id. at 406, 21 P.3d at 809, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 141 and the examples the court gave of protected expression all in-
volved works with a discernable message. Id. ("We emphasize that the trans-
formative elements or creative contributions.., are not confined to parody and
can take many forms, from factual reporting to fictionalized portrayal, from
heavy-handed lampooning to subtle social criticism.") (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 396, 21 P.3d at 802, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133 (internal brackets
and quotes omitted).
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imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain."''
In a society that values freedom of speech, the govern-
ment has no business telling artists that they are forbidden to
depict a public figure (and to sell such depictions to others)
without that person's permission."°2 While Saderup is more
protective of speech than many previous cases, its self-
contradictory opinion relegates drawings, photographs, and
sculptures of celebrities to the category of non-expressive
commercial conduct, subject to regulation at the whim of the
Legislature, instead of treating them as artistic speech pro-
tected against censorship by the First Amendment.
C. The Doe Standard
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,10 (the "Tony Twist" case"°),
the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling in
favor of the defendants. In doing so, the Court expressly re-
jected both the "relatedness" test endorsed by the Restate-
ment0 5 (a test similar to the "artistic relevance" standard of
Rogers, 6 ) and the "transformative use" test of Saderup,°' be-
cause "they give too little consideration to the fact that many
uses of a person's name and identity have both expressive and
commercial components." 8 Instead, the court endorsed a
"predominant use" test borrowed from a law review article"0 9
(written by a litigator who represents celebrities and celebrity
101. Id. at 405, 21 P.3d at 808, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140 (emphasis added).
102. The exception to this principle is advertising in which the unauthorized
use of a celebrity image creates a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship or
endorsement by the celebrity. It is well-established that government may pro-
hibit false and misleading commercial speech without running afoul of the First
Amendment. But a lithograph or a bobblehead doll is not commercial speech,
which is defined as speech that "does no more than propose a commercial trans-
action." Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)).
Certainly no reasonable person would have believed that the Schwarzenegger
bobblehead doll was sponsored or endorsed by the Governor.
103. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
104. For the facts of the case, see supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, cmt. c (1995)
("However, if the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work
that is not related to the identified person, the user may be subject to liability
for a use of the other's identity in advertising.").
106. See discussion supra Part III.A.
107. See discussion supra Part III.B.
108. 110 S.W.3d at 374.
109. Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right
of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471 (2003).
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estates"'):
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual's identity, that product
should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be
protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some
"expressive" content in it that might qualify as "speech" in
other circumstances. If, on the other hand, the predomi-
nant purpose of the product is to make an expressive
comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values
could be given greater weight."'
This test is even more flawed than the Saderup standard.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that whether speech is sold
for profit is legally irrelevant to whether it receives protection
under the First Amendment,"' yet Doe holds that a profit mo-
tive can disqualify speech from First Amendment protec-
tion."3 Under this standard, a movie biography of a celebrity
could be enjoined, because the "predominant" purpose of most
movies is simply to make money for the movie studio. The
Doe test also expressly permits a court to enjoin speech even
if it finds that the speech has expressive content. Virtually
all published speech has both an expressive and a commercial
component, so this test would in effect give a court carte
blanche to censor speech at the behest of a celebrity, based
solely on the court's personal view of the relative value of the
speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rights of publicity create difficult problems for freedom of
expression. All too often, the use of a non-traditional medium
of expression (in the First Amendment sense) and the exis-
tence of a "commercial" motive have caused many courts to
lose sight of the core values at stake. As we have seen, the
tests that courts have devised to account for the value of free
110. See profile of Mark S. Lee, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips,
http://www.manatt.com/showresume.asp?id=1334 (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
Lee has represented management companies for, among others, Elvis Presley,
John Wayne, Jimi Hendrix, Arnold Palmer, Gene Autry, and Diana, Princess of
Wales. Id.
111. 110 S.W.3d at 374 (quotingLee, supra note 109, at 500).
112. See e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967).
113. See 110 S.W.3d at 375 (requiring a jury instruction that defendant "in-
tended to obtain a commercial advantage" from the use of the plaintiffs name).
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expression in right of publicity cases range from the some-
what protective, yet flawed (Saderup"4 ), to the confusing
(ETWs use of Rogers v. Grimaldi"5), to the excessively indul-
gent of a celebrity's assertion of the "commercial" motive of
the expression (Doe"6 and Whitel 7). The defects in these tests
have larger implications that resonate in the Schwarzenegger
bobblehead case. First, they create uncertainty and inconsis-
tency about the ability to make unauthorized expressive uses
of a celebrity's image or "persona.""' Second, the generally
looser First Amendment scrutiny given to right of publicity
claims has encouraged celebrities to attempt to censor uses of
their images that the celebrities deem less than positive-
leading to the problem of "stealth defamation" claims. The
combination of these two problems ultimately has a stultify-
ing effect on freedom of expression concerning a celebrity.
One of the few unsuccessful stealth defamation, or com-
mercial commentary, cases is instructive here. Cardtoons,
L.C v. Major League Baseball Players Ass 'n1 involved par-
ody baseball trading cards featuring caricatures of major
league players and humorous, though often critical, commen-
taries on the caricatures on the reverse side of the cards. The
players sued, alleging violations of their rights of publicity
under Oklahoma law.20 The district court dismissed the
claim, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.12 In its opinion, the
court of appeals wrote that:
elevating the right of publicity above the right to free ex-
114. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 21
P.3d 797, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (2001); discussion supra Part II.B.
115. See 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); discussion supra Part II.A.
116. See 110 S.W. 3d 363 (Mo. 2003); discussion supra Part II.B.
117. See 971 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993); discussion supra pp. 658-59.
118. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the choice of law problem for an ex-
pressive work that is being sold nationwide. While most courts now agree that
the existence of a right of publicity is determined by the law of the plaintiff's
domicile, see, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1146-47 (9th Cir.
2002), it is far from clear that a single state's law should govern infringement of
the right of publicity in every state. See Factors, Etc. Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652
F.2d 278, 281 (2nd Cir. 1981) (expressing doubt on this issue); Schumann v.
Loew's, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (discussing sixty-one causes
of action, one for each state and several territories and foreign countries).
119. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
120. The complaint also alleged a violation of the Lanham Act. The court
easily dismissed that claim, finding no likelihood of confusion between the par-
ody cards and actual, authorized cards. Id. at 966-67.
121. Id. at 962.
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pression would likely prevent distribution of the parody
trading cards. This would not only allow [the Players' As-
sociation] to censor criticism of its members, but would
also have a chilling effect upon future celebrity parodies.
Such a result is clearly undesirable, for "the last thing we
need, the last thing the First Amendment will tolerate, is
a law that lets public figures keep people from mocking
them.
,1 22
Surely this is what the Supreme Court had in mind in
New York Times v. Sullivan when it said:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee
the truth of all his factual assertions ... leads to . . . 'self
censorship.'... Under such a rule, would-be critics of offi-
cial conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism
.... The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the vari-
ety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 23
The consequences of using a lax and inconsistent stan-
dard are at the heart of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead case.
The most serious problem exposed by the Schwarzenegger
lawsuit is that it was brought at all. Although Governor
Schwarzenegger faced an uphill battle under California law,'
the California Supreme Court has thus far only decided cases
near the edges of its test-the fairly unembellished likeness
in Saderup and the grotesque transformation in Winter-and
the bobblehead fell somewhere in between. In Winter, the
California Supreme Court admonished lower courts to dis-
miss obvious cases at the pleading stage.'25 However, as the
bobblehead case demonstrates, where a celebrity has suffi-
cient resources, a colorable, if perhaps weak, lawsuit can still
be filed, and a commercial commentator or detractor may be
deterred from litigating (factoring in the inevitable expense of
122. Id. at 972-73, (quoting White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc)).
123. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
124. A California state court would have applied the "transformative" test of
Saderup and Winter. Under this test, the defendants would have had a strong
argument that the gun and bandolier "transformed" the Governor's image from
a straightforward celebrity image (such as that in Saderup) to a critical com-
mentary (such as that in Winter). But because the Saderup test is an interpre-
tation of the First Amendment, a federal district court would not be bound to
apply Saderup, even to a case arising under California law.
125. Winter, 30 Cal. 4th at 892, 69 P.3d at 480, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642.
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an appeal, regardless of the outcome in the trial court). Thus,
even the transformative use test does not send a sufficiently
clear message that a celebrity cannot control unwanted com-
mentary. The settlement, which permitted the sale of the doll
sans weapons, suppressed the very expression that led to the
doll's creation.1 26 As the Supreme Court noted in another con-
text, it is not just the successful suit that can chill desirable
activity; the threat of a suit can be equally effective, even if
the suit would likely lose.127
The ultimate failure of the legal framework in the
Schwarzenegger case is that the settlement "transformed" a
piece of political satire (the original bobblehead doll) into
something far more akin to an item of commerce by removing
its most transformative expressive elements. A test designed
to protect freedom of speech was instead used to subvert it. It
should be apparent that a legal standard that effectively al-
lows a political figure to censor non-defamatory political
speech is hardly an appropriate role for the First Amend-
ment.
126. As noted in the Statement of Facts, the alleged creator of the doll did not
participate in the settlement because of the elimination of the expression, and
he is now using a different Schwarzenegger doll to criticize the Governor. In-
troduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 14, at 554.
127. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214
(2000), in which the Supreme Court stated: "Competition is deterred, however,
not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit." The
same could be said of speech.
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